Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for github actions issues
8 posts found
A high-severity shell injection vulnerability was discovered in `.forgejo/workflows/docker.yml` where `${{github.ref}}` and `${{github.ref_name}}` were directly interpolated into a bash `run:` step. An attacker could craft malicious git reference names to inject arbitrary commands into the CI runner, potentially stealing secrets and source code. The fix moves these values into intermediate environment variables, preventing command injection.
A GitHub Actions workflow in `reusable-workflow-input-must-declare-type.yaml` was directly interpolating `${{ inputs.constraints }}` inside a `run:` shell step, creating a shell injection vulnerability. An attacker who controls the workflow input could inject arbitrary shell commands into the runner, potentially stealing secrets and source code. The fix moves the untrusted value into an intermediate environment variable, breaking the injection path entirely.
A GitHub Actions workflow in Node.js was storing authentication tokens in plain variables without masking them in logs, creating a critical security risk. When debug mode was enabled or errors occurred, tokens could be exposed in console output and GitHub Actions logs. The fix uses the `setSecret()` API to automatically mask sensitive credentials throughout the execution.
A missing cooldown period in Dependabot configuration creates a supply chain vulnerability by allowing automatic updates to newly published packages that could be malicious or unstable. This fix adds a 7-day cooldown to the `.github/dependabot.yml` file, ensuring newly published package versions are vetted before being proposed for update. This is critical for Node.js libraries where vulnerabilities affect all downstream consumers.
A high-severity vulnerability was discovered in a Node.js library's `.github/dependabot.yml` configuration file where no cooldown period was set for package updates. This exposed the project to potentially malicious or unstable newly-published packages, as Dependabot would immediately propose updates without any waiting period. The fix adds a 7-day cooldown to the npm package-ecosystem configuration, ensuring a safety window before adopting new package versions.
A high-severity security finding was identified in `templates/claude-workflow/workflows/claude.yml` where `secrets: inherit` passed every repository secret to a reusable workflow, violating the principle of least privilege. The fix explicitly passes only `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`—the single secret the called workflow actually needs—drastically reducing the blast radius if the reusable workflow is ever compromised.
A high-severity shell injection vulnerability was discovered in `.github/commaSplitter/action.yaml` where unsanitized user input was directly interpolated into a bash `run:` step using `${{ inputs.input }}`. An attacker could craft a malicious input string to escape the shell command and execute arbitrary code on the GitHub Actions runner, potentially stealing secrets and source code. The fix introduces an intermediate environment variable to safely pass the input without shell interpretation.
A high-severity supply chain vulnerability was discovered in a Dependabot configuration file that lacked cooldown periods for package updates. Without cooldown settings, Dependabot could propose updates to newly published—and potentially malicious—packages immediately after release. The fix adds a 7-day cooldown period to all three package ecosystems (npm, GitHub Actions, and Maven), giving the community time to identify compromised packages before they're automatically proposed.