Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for heap overflow issues
20 posts found
A high-severity integer overflow vulnerability was discovered in the bipartite matching algorithm implementation where unchecked multiplication operations for memory allocation could wrap around, causing undersized buffer allocations and subsequent heap overflow. The fix replaces vulnerable `malloc(sizeof(int) * V)` patterns with safe `calloc(V, sizeof(int))` calls and adds proper bounds validation to prevent exploitation.
A high-severity integer truncation vulnerability was discovered in `Mobility.Uefi.Acpi.cpp` where heap allocation sizes were stored in a 16-bit integer (`MO_UINT16`), causing silent truncation when the computed size exceeded 65535 bytes. This led to undersized heap allocations followed by out-of-bounds writes, exploitable by an attacker who can influence ACPI SRAT table contents in virtualized environments. The fix promotes the size variable to `MO_UINTN` (platform-native width) to prevent trunc
A high-severity integer overflow vulnerability was discovered in QuickJS's libregexp.c where multiplication to compute allocation size could wrap around, causing a heap overflow. The fix replaces the unsafe `malloc(sizeof(capture[0]) * lre_get_alloc_count(bc))` pattern with `calloc(lre_get_alloc_count(bc), sizeof(capture[0]))`, which safely handles the multiplication internally and prevents exploitation.
A critical integer overflow vulnerability in `C/filters/edge_detect.c` allowed an attacker controlling a virtual V4L2 camera device to supply manipulated width/height dimensions that would silently wrap around to zero during multiplication, causing a drastically undersized heap allocation. Subsequent writes to this tiny buffer result in heap corruption, potentially enabling arbitrary code execution. The fix replaces the unsafe `malloc(w * h)` pattern with overflow-safe `calloc((size_t)w, (size_t
A critical heap corruption vulnerability was discovered in a dynamic application loader where size values read directly from untrusted binary files were used to drive memory operations without any bounds validation. An attacker supplying a crafted app binary could overflow heap buffers, corrupt memory, and potentially achieve arbitrary code execution. The fix introduces strict bounds checks before memory operations and replaces unsafe allocation patterns with overflow-safe alternatives.
A critical integer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `include/enet.h` where size calculations derived from attacker-controlled network values could overflow before being passed to `enet_malloc`, resulting in undersized heap allocations and subsequent heap corruption. The fix adds proper bounds checking to sector I/O code, preventing attackers from triggering heap overflows by sending crafted network packets. This class of vulnerability is particularly dangerous in networked applications b
A critical out-of-bounds memory vulnerability was discovered and patched in `utils/symbol-rawelf.c`, where two separate `memcpy` calls lacked proper bounds validation when processing ELF binary files. Without these checks, a maliciously crafted ELF file could trigger an out-of-bounds read or heap overflow, potentially leading to remote code execution or memory corruption. This post breaks down how the vulnerability works, how it was fixed, and what every C developer should know about safe memory
A critical integer overflow vulnerability in DNS record processing code could have allowed a malicious DNS server to trigger a heap buffer overflow, potentially enabling remote code execution. The fix ensures safe bounds checking before performing size calculations, closing a subtle but devastating attack vector that lurks in network-facing C code.
A critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered and patched in a BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) characteristic write handler, where missing bounds checks allowed any nearby Bluetooth device to send oversized payloads and potentially execute arbitrary code. This fix adds essential buffer-length validation before memory copy operations, closing a remote attack vector that required zero authentication to exploit. Understanding this class of vulnerability is essential for any developer work
A critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered and patched in `ble_spam.c`, where two consecutive `memcpy` calls copied attacker-controlled data into fixed-size heap buffers without validating the copy length first. An attacker within Bluetooth range could exploit this flaw to crash the target device, corrupt memory, or potentially execute arbitrary code — all without any authentication. The fix adds a proper bounds check before the copy operations, ensuring the length derived from
A critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered and patched in `src/opkit_compile.c`, where multiple `memcpy` calls copied user-controlled data into heap-allocated buffers without verifying destination buffer sizes. Left unpatched, this flaw could allow attackers to overwrite heap metadata or function pointers, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution. The fix ensures proper bounds checking before all memory copy operations.
A critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered and patched in libfaac's audio filter bank processing code, where unvalidated memcpy operations could allow attackers to corrupt heap memory through maliciously crafted audio metadata. This type of vulnerability can lead to arbitrary code execution, making it one of the most dangerous classes of security bugs in native code. Understanding how this flaw works — and how it was fixed — is essential reading for any developer working with C