Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for strncpy issues
4 posts found
A high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `src/calculations.c` at line 37, where a two-step `strncpy` + manual null-termination pattern left the door open for subtle memory safety bugs when copying string data into the `entry->type` field. The fix replaces both lines with a single `snprintf` call that handles bounds and null-termination atomically, eliminating the risk entirely. This is a common C pitfall that affects production CLI tools and can be exploited when attacker-
Three unsafe string copy calls in `src/cyw43.c` — including a bare `strcpy()` and two `strncpy()` calls — created buffer overflow risks in a CYW43 Wi-Fi driver emulation layer. The fix replaces all three with `snprintf()`, which enforces buffer size limits and guarantees null-termination in a single, consistent operation. Left unaddressed, these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker controlling input like a TAP interface name or SSID to corrupt adjacent memory and potentially execute arbitrary
A high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `src/apps/common/apputils.c`, where `strncpy()` was used without guaranteed null-termination across four call sites — including the `sock_bind_to_device()` and `getdomainname()` functions. The fix replaces all unsafe `strncpy()` calls with `snprintf()`, which enforces both length bounds and automatic null-termination. Left unpatched, these flaws could allow an attacker to corrupt memory, crash the process, or potentially execute arb
A high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `bin/nad/ftw.c` where unsafe `strncpy()` calls lacked proper NULL-termination guarantees. The fix replaces the vulnerable pattern with `strlcpy()`, a safer bounded string copy function that automatically handles NULL-termination and prevents buffer overflows in file tree walking operations.