Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for yaml issues
10 posts found
A misconfigured Spring Boot Actuator in the ArkCase 2021.04 provisioning template exposed all management endpoints through wildcard inclusion. The fix narrows exposure to health and info endpoints only, eliminating unauthenticated access to sensitive runtime data.
We fixed a high-severity supply chain security gap in `.github/dependabot.yml` where missing cooldown periods allowed immediate adoption of newly published packages. The fix adds `cooldown: default-days: 7` to all package ecosystems, creating a critical security buffer against typosquatting and malicious dependency attacks.
A missing `cooldown` block in the Dependabot configuration for a Node.js project left it exposed to potentially malicious or unstable newly published packages. By adding a `cooldown: default-days: 7` setting, the project now waits seven days before proposing updates, giving the security community time to identify and flag compromised packages before they reach your codebase.
A GitHub Actions workflow in `templates/devto/devto-readme.yml` referenced `actions/checkout@v4` and `actions/setup-node@v4` using mutable version tags instead of pinned commit SHAs. This pattern enables supply-chain attacks where a compromised action owner silently repoints a tag to malicious code. The fix pins both actions to their full 40-character commit SHAs while preserving version comments for maintainability.
A GitHub Actions workflow was using `actions/checkout@v1`, a mutable tag reference that could be silently repointed by the action owner to inject malicious code. This supply-chain vulnerability was fixed by pinning the action to a specific commit SHA (`11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683`), ensuring the workflow always executes verified, immutable code.
A high-severity denial-of-service vulnerability (GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj) in js-yaml versions 4.3.0 and 3.x caused quadratic CPU consumption when resolving `!!omap` (ordered map) types in YAML documents. Attackers who could supply crafted YAML input could cause CPU exhaustion proportional to the square of the input size, potentially grinding Node.js services to a halt. The fix upgrades js-yaml to 4.3.1 and pins the version via a `package.json` overrides block to ensure no transitive dependency can r
A high-severity shell injection vulnerability was discovered in `.forgejo/workflows/docker.yml` where `${{github.ref}}` and `${{github.ref_name}}` were directly interpolated into a bash `run:` step. An attacker could craft malicious git reference names to inject arbitrary commands into the CI runner, potentially stealing secrets and source code. The fix moves these values into intermediate environment variables, preventing command injection.
A high-severity security finding was identified in `templates/claude-workflow/workflows/claude.yml` where `secrets: inherit` passed every repository secret to a reusable workflow, violating the principle of least privilege. The fix explicitly passes only `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`—the single secret the called workflow actually needs—drastically reducing the blast radius if the reusable workflow is ever compromised.
A high-severity shell injection vulnerability was discovered in `.github/commaSplitter/action.yaml` where unsanitized user input was directly interpolated into a bash `run:` step using `${{ inputs.input }}`. An attacker could craft a malicious input string to escape the shell command and execute arbitrary code on the GitHub Actions runner, potentially stealing secrets and source code. The fix introduces an intermediate environment variable to safely pass the input without shell interpretation.
A hardcoded AWS Access Key ID (`AKIAVCODYLSA53PQK4ZA`) was discovered embedded in a signed S3 URL within the `CVE-2024-51482.yaml` nuclei template file. This credential, while part of a pre-signed URL reference link, was flagged as a high-severity finding because it exposes a real AWS access key in a public repository. The fix removes the entire reference URL containing the embedded credential.