Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for eval issues
4 posts found
The eval.mjs command handler used raw `eval()` to execute JavaScript expressions, creating a critical code injection path if owner credentials are compromised. The fix replaces `eval()` with the `AsyncFunction` constructor and explicitly shadows `process`, `require`, and other runtime globals as parameters, preventing evaluated code from reaching the Node.js runtime even when authentication boundaries fail.
A high-severity code injection vulnerability was discovered in `TurnPlanner.tsx`, where the `parseInputExpr` function used JavaScript's `Function` constructor — effectively `eval()` — to evaluate user-provided mathematical expressions. The regex guard in place only checked for the presence of arithmetic operators, not whether the input was safe to execute, leaving the door open for arbitrary JavaScript injection. A targeted whitelist fix was applied to reject any input containing characters outs
A medium-severity vulnerability was discovered in a Slack data processing component where the use of Python's built-in `eval()` function to parse error message dictionaries could allow an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary code. The fix replaces `eval()` with the safer `ast.literal_eval()`, which safely evaluates only Python literals without executing arbitrary expressions. This change eliminates a critical attack surface that could have been exploited through crafted error messages return
A high-severity code injection vulnerability was discovered and patched in Brownie's network configuration CLI, where the use of Python's `eval()` function on potentially untrusted input could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code. The fix eliminates the dangerous `eval()` call in favor of safer alternatives, closing a door that could have been exploited to fully compromise systems running the affected tooling. This post breaks down how the vulnerability worked, how it was fixed, and what ev