Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for express js issues
5 posts found
A critical authorization flaw in `src/v1/routes/index.js` allowed any authenticated API key holder to access arbitrary budgets by manipulating the `budgetSyncId` URL parameter. The fix introduces an environment-based allowlist that validates budget access before processing requests.
A critical security vulnerability in `routes.js` exposed a `/test` endpoint in production without any authentication or authorization checks, potentially allowing attackers to gather system information and reconnaissance data. The fix restricts this debugging endpoint to non-production environments only, preventing unauthorized access while preserving development functionality.
A HIGH severity Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability was found in `integrationExamples/topics/topics-server.js`, an Express.js demo server that lacked any CSRF protection middleware. The file was deleted entirely after assessment determined it posed unnecessary risk to downstream consumers of this Node.js library.
A semgrep audit flagged `devboard/server/index.js` for lacking any CSRF middleware, meaning every state-changing route (`POST`, `PUT`, `DELETE` under `/api/*`) could be triggered by a forged cross-origin request riding on a victim's session cookie. The fix wires in `cookie-parser` and `csurf` right after body parsing, so every mutating request now requires a valid, per-session CSRF token before it reaches route handlers.
A critical security vulnerability was discovered in the Apple Store API implementation where three authentication endpoints (`/auth/login`, `/auth/refresh`, `/auth/reset`) lacked rate limiting protection. This allowed unlimited authentication attempts from a single IP address, enabling credential stuffing and brute force attacks. The fix implements an in-memory rate limiter that restricts each IP to 5 requests per 15-minute window.