Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for logging issues
3 posts found
A browser extension's `src/background/credentials.js` printed the full Strava authentication cookie string — including a signed JWT and CloudFront-Signature values — straight into the extension console via `console.debug`. Anyone who could open DevTools on the background page (or any tooling that scraped the console) could copy a live session and impersonate the user. The fix replaces the credential payload in both log statements with `Boolean(credentials)` and strips a realistic-looking JWT out
A critical vulnerability in Supabase Edge Functions allowed sensitive authentication errors and API credentials to leak through verbose error logging. The `cancel-subscription/index.ts` function logged full error objects to the console, potentially exposing Paddle API keys and auth tokens in deployment logs. The fix sanitizes all error messages to log only safe error text while preserving debugging capability.
A critical vulnerability was discovered in AESEncryption.java where decrypted plaintext was being printed directly to standard output, exposing sensitive data to anyone with access to application logs. This fix eliminates the dangerous logging pattern that completely undermined the purpose of AES encryption. Understanding this vulnerability is essential for any developer building applications that handle sensitive encrypted data.