Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for open redirect issues
4 posts found
The `withProxy()` fetch wrapper allowed automatic HTTP redirects from `api.tomys.top`, trusting the external API's domain integrity without validating final destinations. A compromised or malicious redirect response could send users to attacker-controlled phishing sites while maintaining HTTPS protocol and hostname checks that falsely appear secure.
A background-image updater fetched a configured image URL with manual redirect handling and then re-issued the request to whatever `Location` header came back, with no scheme or host checks. A redirect to `http://169.254.169.254/` or `http://127.0.0.1:<port>/` would have been followed with the original fetch options attached, and the response body written to disk as an image asset. The fix resolves the redirect target against `imgDownloadUrl` and rejects anything that is not HTTPS on the same ho
A critical open redirect vulnerability was discovered in `weex/src/index.we` where the `onclick()` handler passed raw user input directly to `navigator.push()` without any URL validation. An attacker could supply a `javascript:` URI or a phishing URL, causing the app to navigate to arbitrary destinations. The fix adds a strict `https?://` protocol check before any navigation occurs.
A medium-severity vulnerability (CVE-2025-50182) was discovered in urllib3 that fails to properly control HTTP redirects in browsers and Node.js environments. This flaw could allow attackers to redirect users to malicious sites or bypass security controls through crafted redirect chains. The vulnerability has been patched in the latest urllib3 release, and developers should update their dependencies immediately.