Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for pickle issues
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A high-severity arbitrary code execution vulnerability was discovered in `tools/ardy-engine/retarget.py` where `np.load()` was called with `allow_pickle=True`, enabling attackers to embed malicious pickle payloads in `.npz` files. The fix was a single-character change—switching `allow_pickle=True` to `allow_pickle=False`—that eliminates the deserialization attack vector while preserving the file's legitimate array data loading functionality.
A high-severity arbitrary code execution vulnerability was discovered in `scripts/export_joyvasa_audio.py` where `torch.load()` was called with `weights_only=False`, allowing any pickle-serialized Python object — including malicious code — to execute during checkpoint loading. The fix switches to `weights_only=True` and explicitly allowlists only the two non-standard classes the checkpoint actually requires: `argparse.Namespace` and `pathlib.PosixPath`. This closes a real code execution path tha