Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for static analysis issues
22 posts found
A high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `generic/eth-impl.c`, where unsafe `strncpy()` and `sprintf()` calls could write beyond buffer boundaries when handling network interface names and device filenames. The fix replaced these dangerous functions with bounded `snprintf()` calls that guarantee null-termination and prevent memory corruption.
A critical buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `intl/localename.c` where the `gl_locale_name_canonicalize()` function used unsafe `strcpy()` operations to copy locale names into fixed-size buffers without bounds checking. An attacker controlling locale environment variables could overflow the destination buffer, leading to memory corruption and potential code execution. The fix replaced `strcpy()` with bounded `strncpy()` calls to prevent buffer overruns.
A critical buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `sbin/restore/tape.c` where the `setinput()` function used unsafe `strcpy()` to copy user-controlled input into a fixed-size buffer without bounds checking. The fix replaces `strcpy()` with `strlcpy()`, which enforces a maximum copy length and prevents the overflow. This vulnerability could have allowed attackers to corrupt memory and potentially execute arbitrary code through long command-line arguments.
A high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `src/calculations.c` at line 37, where a two-step `strncpy` + manual null-termination pattern left the door open for subtle memory safety bugs when copying string data into the `entry->type` field. The fix replaces both lines with a single `snprintf` call that handles bounds and null-termination atomically, eliminating the risk entirely. This is a common C pitfall that affects production CLI tools and can be exploited when attacker-
A high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `profile.c` where `sprintf()` was used to format server addresses without any bounds checking. An attacker who could influence the `SERVER_BASE_PORT` value or trigger integer overflow in the port calculation could write beyond the `server_address` buffer. The fix replaces `sprintf()` with `snprintf()` using explicit buffer size limits at both call sites (lines 99 and 220).
A high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `src/apps/common/apputils.c`, where `strncpy()` was used without guaranteed null-termination across four call sites — including the `sock_bind_to_device()` and `getdomainname()` functions. The fix replaces all unsafe `strncpy()` calls with `snprintf()`, which enforces both length bounds and automatic null-termination. Left unpatched, these flaws could allow an attacker to corrupt memory, crash the process, or potentially execute arb
A critical buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `general/libzlib/gzlib.c` where multiple `strcpy()` and `strcat()` calls operated without bounds checking. An attacker controlling file paths or error messages could overflow destination buffers, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution. The fix replaces these unsafe string operations with bounded `memcpy()` calls that respect pre-calculated buffer lengths.
A critical buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in stb_image.h at line 4823, where a memcpy operation copied image data without validating buffer bounds. The multiplication of width (x) and channel count (img_n) could overflow or exceed allocated memory, allowing attackers to corrupt memory through malicious PNG files. The fix adds an explicit size_t cast to prevent integer overflow during the buffer size calculation.
A high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `src/GL/arbgenerator.c` where `sprintf()` was used without size bounds checking on an 11-byte buffer. The fix replaces unsafe `sprintf()` calls with `snprintf()`, enforcing strict buffer boundaries and preventing potential heap corruption or code execution attacks.
A critical buffer overflow vulnerability in `src/rpconfig.h` allowed attackers to corrupt memory by providing configuration values exceeding buffer size limits. The `rpcSetText()` function used `strcpy()` to copy user-controlled data into a fixed 256-byte buffer without bounds checking, enabling stack corruption and potential code execution. Replacing `strcpy()` with `strncpy()` and enforcing a 255-byte limit eliminated the overflow risk.
A critical buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `src/st-util/gdb-server.c` where unbounded `memcpy()` and `strcpy()` calls could write beyond allocated buffer boundaries when processing user-supplied command-line arguments. The fix replaces all unsafe string operations with bounds-checked alternatives like `snprintf()` and `memcpy()` with explicit length validation.
A critical integer overflow vulnerability was discovered in `src/api.c`'s `find_config_path()` function, where string lengths were added together without overflow checks before allocating a buffer. An attacker controlling environment variables like `APPDATA`, `HOME`, or `XDG_DATA_HOME` could supply extremely long values to trigger an integer overflow, resulting in an undersized buffer allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow. The fix adds explicit overflow guards using `SIZE_MAX` compari