Security vulnerabilities and automated fixes for tauri issues
4 posts found
A critical CSS injection vulnerability in `testpage/App.vue` allowed attackers to bypass weak HTML5 pattern validation and load malicious stylesheets. The fix replaces direct variable assignment with a hardened `setCustomStylesheetHref()` method using strict regex validation.
A critical vulnerability in a Tauri desktop application allowed GitHub API tokens with full `repo` scope to be written to plaintext local storage files via the `getAllSettings()` function in `src/config/settings.ts`. Any process with filesystem access — including malware, other apps, or a logged-in attacker — could silently extract these tokens. The fix introduces a `SENSITIVE_KEYS` exclusion set that prevents credentials from being serialized to disk.
A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in `renderer/views/library.js` allowed attackers who could control mod metadata—such as category icons rendered in pack thumbnail grids—to inject arbitrary JavaScript through unescaped output in `innerHTML` assignments. The fix wraps the `catIcon()` return value in the existing `esc()` helper, ensuring all dynamically generated HTML content is properly encoded before insertion into the DOM.
A critical vulnerability in `src/routes/+page.svelte` allowed attackers to supply arbitrary URLs—including `http://` and local file paths—through query parameters and drag-drop events, which were then fetched without validation. The fix restricts input to HTTPS-only URLs and removes the dangerous local file fetch path entirely, eliminating both SSRF and local file disclosure attack vectors.